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Abstract: Practices of expert system development are not widely 
investigated. In this paper I describe results of case studies on the in-
house deployment of small expert systems in two companies, along with 
a review of empirical research. The investigation focuses on the 
underlying rationale of the observed practices dqring the stages of 
design, field transfer and use. The examples show the importance of 
integrative approaches to technical and organizational aspects of 
development projects. The remaining potential for organizational 
turbulences is explained with inherent tensions of the rationale. 
fil). 
Acknowledgernents: This research was funded by a scholarship grant from the German Research 
Foundation (DFG ). During my affiliation with the research area Computing, Organizations, Policy, and 
Research (CORPS) at UC Irvine 1 enjóyed many fruitful discussions, especiálly with Rob Kling, Leigh Star, 
Jonathan P. Allen, Bruce Ferguson, Rogers Hall, Jeanne Pickering, Karen Ruhleder, Ed Shi, and Karen 
Wieckert. Last, not least, 1 am grateful for the cooperation of the interview-partners and companies. 

l. lntroduction 
Though AJ and computers are ofien assigned a 
function to enhance creativity and the transition to 
a post-industrial culture, the phenomena .. . seem 
to be only an extension of the serial production 
which characterizes the industrial culture. 
(Negrotti 90:6) 
It is increasingly ack.nowledged that information system design is not only a 
matter of technology alone but also one of the context in which development 
takes place. The system being designed and its organizational context must be 
seen as interacting with each other, notas separate entities. To understand the 
results of system developments we therefore have to focus on the process, not 
just on the product (cf. Floyd 87). During the process of development technical 
and organizational aspects continually influence each other. Companies taking 
on system development are forced to deal with this interaction. They thereby 
create their own practices. 
Through the analysis of practices we may gain insights into characteristics of 
the development process. This should contribute to our understanding of design 
procedures as well as to an assessment of impacts. The interactive perspective 
appears all the more valid for expert systems, as the necessities of soliciting, 
structuring and representing heuristic knowledge in many cases involve persons 
from other than the traditional programming departments from early on (cf. 
Mumford a. McDonald 89). 
Therefore it was the goal of the two case studies reported here to investigate 
how companies actually approach expert systems development, not aimed at 
merely research or educational purposes. Practices are understood here as the 
set of strategies, activities and explicit reasoning applied during systems 
development with regard to technical, organizational and human factors. The 
analysis of the cases uncovers the underlying rationale in the practices and 
shows advantages and obstacles encountered during the development processes. 
The cases were chosen from areas supposed to be characteristic rather than 
esoteric, namely applications in offices, production and maintenance areas. In-
house developments were selected, since the interaction aspect of technology and 
organization can be expected to be more diverse than with systems bought from 
the shelf. 
Methodology 
Expert systems are a special type of interactive software. To deal with them 
from an empirical perspective, both aspects of this definition must be observed, 
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the features making them special and their relationship to the general 
development of information technology. 
With the growing distribution of information technology beyond its former 
confinement in data processing centers · the insigh t grew that the social aspects 
of system development processes become more important. Decisions in the course 
of these processes are neither just a matter of strategic choices of the 
management, nor of the capabilities of the technology alone. Rather it is the 
'web' of organizational setting, technology and social factors, underlying the 
development process of computerization (Kling a. Scacchi 82). Expert systems as 
part of information technology therefore are amenable to a variety of functional 
and organizational design solutions, facilitating augmenting as well as 
automating approaches (Beuschel 91). Therefore, the focus of the study was not 
on a pre-post-statement of changes, but to understand the interaction of 
organizational, technical and human aspects of the development process and its 
consequences. 
From the viewpoint of their special features, no simple, undisputed definition of 
what an expert system is exists. In the context of this paper they are seen as 
a specific type of interactive systems, aimed at the reification of decision-making 
processes. For the purpose of an empirical investigation it seems appropriate to 
state selection criteria more precisely. Two required features for selection were 
added, since expert systems are introduced into work procedures where cognitive 
processes are involved: a distinct knowledge acquisition process during the 
course of the development process and the existence of a separate knowledge or 
rule base as part of the system infrastructure. 
A research approach using qualitative case studies has the advantage of in-
depth explorations of issues. The studies retrospectively followed the way how 
a development process emerged within a company. Depending on the operational 
status of a system three main stages of the process were assumed, design, field 
transfer and operational use. 
The cases were selected according to criteria of variance and relevance. This 
means, they should come from different industrial sectors to allow for a broader 
picture of determinants in applications and they should appear important 
enough that the conditions could be extended to similar task environments or 
businesses within the same sector. 
Review of Empirical Research 
Much of the research literature about Al and expert systems was concerned with 
theoretical or normative methods, neglecting empirical studies. Organizational 
aspects were mainly understood as the topics of adequateness of application 
areas, or of the management of critical events in projects (cf. Bobrow et al. 86). 
Now, as expert systems are slowly drifting away from elite applications, gaining 
more practica! relevance, it still can be claimed for expert systems that "job and 
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organizational design issues are rarely addressed in the literature" (Óstberg 88: 
169). 
Another reason for the lack of empirical research might be that compared to 
other systems the diffusion of expert systems in industry and service is still low. 
Many of the developments are experimental prototypes or feasability studies, 
and the technical capabilities of systems are still under development1. Due to 
many unjustified 'myths' and 'legends' about technical capabilities (Fox 90), their 
diffusion process was slower than predicted, and only in the recent years the 
field gained momentum (Leonard-Barton and Sviokla 88). The lack of systems 
in operation also accounts for the lack of quantitatively representative studies, 
even in countries with otherwise strong research and development activities2• 
On the other hand, most available in-depth studies do not focus on practices as 
defined above. They are either devoted to large and demanding development 
projects, which draw on large resources of budget and time and are combined 
with prolonged development periods and extended research status. Or, they do 
not put much attention on practices of design or use. But large and complex 
systems represent the exemption rather than the rule so far. More typical for 
the kind of development activities being taken on now in many companies seem 
to be types of 'medium' or 'low road' systems. They make use of available symbol 
processing capabilities of computers. 'High road' systems in contrast would 
require the inclusion of deep knowledge (the terms were coined by John Seeley 
Brown 86). 
Available studies nevertheless describe important dimensions of research and 
their previous experiences might point to generalizable problem issues and 
explanations. 
Enid Mumford and Bruce MacDonald (89), in an extensive case study where 
they both played also an active role, analyze the development of one of the most 
frequently cited expert systems, XSEL of the Digital Equipment Corporation. 
The authors depict the development process of eight years as an 'ongoing 
journey', showing the many requirement definition changes being made. 
According to their experience the organizational implementation proved to be 
much more difficult than the technical design. The analysis focuses on how over 
the years business strategies, management attitudes, group structures and 
expectations constitute a changing 'task environment' and thereby influence the 
task of design itself. The study pleads for the necessity of participative design 
approaches and shows the difficulties of transferring the system from US offices 
to European offices, mainly due to a later user involvement. While the book 
covers the intricacies of development processes quite vividly, it does not put so 
much attention on questions of the system's future life cycle. It should be noted 
that about 30 people were required to maintain XSEL (Coy and Bonsiepen 91) 
at last, and that its huge know~~dge base of more than 10.000 rules is at a limit 
of becoming 'unmaintainable' (Ostberg 88). 
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Several explorative studies were carried out by two groups within the framework 
of a technology assessment project by the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) in Geneva on the impact of expert systems on work organization and skills 
(cf. Bernold and Hillenkamp 89). Kornwachs and Bullinger (89) investigated two 
systems in Germany and state the somewhat contradictory diversity of impacts, 
encorporating for instance up- and deskilling effects. They emphasize a picture 
of stepwise integration of expert systems into conventional systems, providing . 
an advantage to those companies with already highly developed information 
technology. The cases show that protocolling functions are facilitated by an 
expert system used as part of a network, rendering the basis for centralized 
control. One case points to the job enrichment opportunity for a machine 
operator, thereby possibly changing extra-departmental boundaries. Senker et al. 
(89) in their study of three British systems confirm these findings. They state 
that expert systems extend work areas amenable to automation but they do not 
expect them to have unique impacts, compared with information technology 
development in general. 
Sviokla (86) investigated three commercial expert systems in use from the 
vantage point of strategic advantages for a company. His socio-economic 
approach shows how task procedures of people become more rigid by using 
expert systems for previously ill-structured problems, while organizational 
structures are adapted. Strategic advantages gained by this 'progressive 
structuring' are claimed, but the study fails to relate them unambiguously to the 
use of the systems in question, since the interaction with the organizational 
changes is not analyzed. 
Wieckert (90) shows in a case study of a research and development project in 
an aerospace company how the original goal of replacing an experienced 
electrician is changed during several iteration stages to the more modest goal 
of a support system for a maintenance engineer, while the system is still 
considered a success by the company. Her field study exemplifies the stepwise 
requirement degradations as a failure to capture the craftsman's bodily skills, 
his physical and spatial knowledge, and his 'deep' knowledge about the domain. 
The author's socio-historical analysis suggests that these mismatches are owed 
to the difference between ideals of expertise and knowledge -- conveyed by AI-
theory -- and the requirements of everyday practice. To explain why the system 
after plenty of changes is still considered successful, she offers the view that 
expert system development does not emulate the expertise of individuals, but 
i:.ather creates an entry into the work process (a perspective also taken by 
Ostberg 88). The intervention allows for negotiating a match between system 
design and work needs, the developers drawing either on, the expert's direct 
participation or on aspects of practices at his work setting. The organizational 
setting in this way acts as a prerequisite as well as a result of the development 
process, in which conflicts and negotiated solutions take place. 
Summarizing, the studies confirm the possible variety of design solutions when 
expert systems are embedded into a organizational structure. Mumford's as well 
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as Wieckert's study reveal also that expert systems theory does not provide 
adequate means for coping with practical requirements of organizational aspects. 
2. Practices in Design, Transfer and Use 
Project Background 
The paper describes part of my ongoing research on information technology, 
work organization' and skills, since two years pursued with a focus on expert 
systems. About a dozen experts in academia and the consulting business were 
interviewed in arder to prepare the framework for the study. The resulting 
guidelines and a collection of controversia! issues, based on the expert talks, 
were used during the half-structured interviews with application experts, 
conducted between September '89 and March '90. Talks were led with a group 
manager and a developer in the first case, with a research engineer and an 
analyst in the latter. The interviews focused on strategies, experiences, and 
reasons for decisions . during the main process stages. Also,. system 
demonstrations and the analysis of printed material made available by the 
companies were includedª. 
Very clearly, the empirical basis employed here is small and generalizations 
have rather the character of trend extrapolations than approved statistics. In 
order to escape a too narrow an explanation background, other sources were 
used as a corrective. These were the preceeding talks with the experts, 
conference reports on expert systems, and the available empirical studies. 
The fictitious titles EXOFFICE and EXMAINT were chosen for the case study 
areas in arder to establish anonymity of the participating interviewees and 
compames. · 
The cases show practices for in-house-developments of expert systems in two 
large companies. One case depicts procedures to initiate the development of 
systems in all kinds of administrative or technical offices of an established 
computer manufacturing company in Palo Alto. The second gives the example 
of a diagnostic system for maintenance support in the field production of a 
worldwide operating oil company, its R&D department based in Southern 
California. 
EXOFFICE: Practices of a Computer Manufacturing Company / Technical and 
Clerical Offices 
For obvious reasons the computer industry belongs to the earliest and most 
extensive users of its own products, since people are conE;Jtantly encouraged and 
have easy computer access. This holds true also for AI-activities in the computer 
systems manufacturing company. A large and complex expert system was in the 
prototype stage to be used in wafer production of computer chips. But, according 
to one of the developers, it seemed to fail to represent the engineers' knowledge 
5 

to the maintenance personnel and therefore was about to be redefined as a 
'training system'. 
At the same time, as a rather broadly aimed activity, the company decided in 
1988 to promote in-house applications of expert systems on a less demanding 
level. A group was installed within the information technology department, here 
referred to as Advanced Systems Group (ASG), with the aim of providing 
advising capacity on the automation of decision-oriented problems in offices. The 
group head was hired from within the company, with 10 years of experience in 
the hardware field of information technology, acquiring AI-knowledge by self-
education. Both of his current collaborators in the small group were educated in 
computer science and cognitive psychology. 
The special development strategy pursued in the latter case was to initiate the 
idea of introducing expert systems into the decision making of different 
departments. After receiving a request, ASG then essentially gáve interested 
groups help for starting their own project. This was done by searching for 
appropriate applications and by providing tools. In sorne cases they also 
developed a prototype. But basically the department professionals were supposed 
to do their own knowledge acquisition with the help of the tools after a few 
start-up sessions with ASG. The rationale behind the approach was to reach 
"more consistency in decision making", as the ASG-manager put it, viewed as an 
equivalent to the idea of quality control in manufacturing. 
ASG always stressed the point of keeping volume and requirements of 
developments low: "U se the smallest tool that solves your problem". For this 
purpose LISP and dedicated equipment was shunned and instead a software 
package used, enabling the various departments to acquire knowledge vía 
hypertext and to model rules as decision trees. Clearly, the management goal 
was also to reduce skill requirements: 
"Giving people a system to make their decisions more consistent, that's 
a value. Empowering people to make decisions on a lower level by giving 
them automated assistance is another way. [The company] tends to try 
to manage by allowing people to make decisions at the lowest level 
where they have the skills and the opportunity to make the decisions 
because it's a more responsible environment that way. I think expert 
systems enable that more effectively because it allows sorne decisions to 
be made a level lower than they were made in the past, but with 
confidence" (Manager ASG). 
In this way several initial projects were carried out, all of them but one being 
tested and in use since approximately fall '89. The average time for completion 
took about four weeks. While in these cases ASG did all the knowledge 
engineering, the expertise was provided by an expert at each division of the 
company. The systems were developed for the following problem areas: 
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Troubleshooting for a software application (diagnosis problem): problems 
encountered by users of an interna! accounting information system can 
be analyzed going through steps of questioning, determining if one of ten 
of the most general problems in the accounting system might be 
responsible, 
Determining required sizes of datasets (configuration problem): field 
personnel using a database at customer sites can, after a series of 
questions, determine which entry size for datasets is needed, 
Production track selection in chip manufacturing (matching problem): 
the sequence of manufacturing steps necessary to produce parts within 
given specifications is selected from a library of about 250 alternatives, 
according to a production worker's new part order, 
Parameter preselection in wafer production (optimization problem): the 
system identifies several process parameters during a production run 
and helps the operator optimizing test runs, putting engineer's knowledge 
of complex calculations in the hands of the operator, 
Performance survey in materials management/prototype (matching 
problem): information about aspects like quality, responsiveness and cost 
of commodity vendors is collected and evaluated against established 
qualifications, thereby maintaining a checklist for the materials 
department for selection of vendors. 
The emphasis of the development practice was never on purely technical 
matters, though: 
"My experience has been that ... it's not the technical aspects of the 
technology, but rather the organizational and application-oriented 
aspects" (Manager ASG). 
Despite that awareness, and despite involving intended users into design right 
from the beginning, several problems showed up during the different stages of 
development. The group manager reported that it was difficult to correct 
unrealistic expectations of the departments concerning a match between 
technical capabilities, project volumes considered 'do-able' and the available 
knowledge about systems. Transferring systems from the design stage to regular 
use was considered a critica! phase. It often only then showed up whether user 
involvement was appropriate or not. According to sorne examples, user interfaces 
tended to be too complicated and had to be simplified with regard to their 
information representation and interactional procedures. 
The manager saw the basic requirement for a successful fielding process 
primarily in the decentralized approach to AI-activities. So far, no essential 
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organizational conflicts occured during that phase. If a reduction of skill 
requirements had actually taken place it was not recognizable yet. 
The main remaining question was how to maintain the topicality and conformity 
of rules in the knowledge base. This was apparently neglected in the beginning 
by developers due to easy prototyping facilities. For long-term use of expert 
systems it was considered essential that the knowledge base had to be adaptable 
to new rules without allowing severa! copies of a system to develop in different 
directions. Individual users could not be allowed to have access. To update 
several systems of the same type organizational procedures of access had still 
to be developed. A possible solution was seen in delegating this task to the 
original 'owner', from whom the problem being transferred to the expert system 
carne. In this way no changes in responsibility and decision making would take 
place. But this issue of developing organizational infrastructure was still to be 
resolved in all cases. 
EXMAINT: Practices of an Oil Company / Field Production Maintenance 
Modelling and survey requirements motivated the use of voluminous data 
processing equipment in the oil industry during the past years. The potential of 
expert systems technology was tested from very early on. Examples of complex 
systems are Dipmeter Advisor, Mudman or Prospectar, but the problems tackled 
were so severe that their use was confined to casual cases. 
Like the computer manufacturer the oil company commands a large department 
for research and development with approximately 600 engineers and computer 
scientists, also supporting all needs for data processing in all branches of the 
company. According to the analyst, soft- and even hardware was developed 
among several rival groups in the research departments. But in contrast, the 
company did not support separate AI-groups. All of those activities were based 
on personal interests and efforts of the researchers, sometimes in cooperation 
with universities. 
The investigated example reports on a system built for a much simpler and 
frequently noted task for expert systems -- diagnosis -- in this case of wells, a 
part of oil production equipment. The system is in operation since 1987 with 
installations at 44 sites mostly in the US, but also one installation in Canada 
and in Indonesia. A site can be understood as an oilfield, containing about one 
to two thousand wells. Work groups are made up of a foreman, responsible for 
half of each field, with 2 or 3 production specialists for 200-300 wells and 
several pumpers, each one responsible for 60-70 wells. The research engineer 
estimates about 100-200 production workers as the regular users of the expert 
system. 
In the past ten years several dedicated microprocessor based systems were 
developed by the research engineers to be used in all areas of oil field 
production. The systems also made it possible to narrow the job description of 
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production specialists, from executing very broad tasks and responsibilities in 
the oil field to rather small maintenance tasks on the wells. As a (desired) 
consequence, personnel with lower skills had been hired since then. But 
afterwards there were delays in detecting and reporting maintenance problems, 
thereby reducing production capacity. So the idea for using an expert system 
was brought up by sorne of the research engineers. The development strategy 
was to use the available knowledge about the wells to build a system as part of . 
the previoUsly installed microcomputer system. 
The system analyzes data readily available from another program. It produces 
a diagnostic chart containing conclusions the production people may follow or 
use in their own way in arder to regain the full production capacity. 
The development was done by the research engineers themselves since the 
models and rules had to make use of knowledge about oil wells only they 
possessed, not the production workers. A group of four engineers took part in 
the knowledge acquisition process, one of them the interviewee, now the group 
head. Due to the identity of knowledge engineers and experts in this case no 
problems occured during the design phase. 
The transfer of the system into field use required not only a technical 
adaptation due to rough environmental conditions. The diagnostic output also 
had to be made more 'readable' for the knowledge level of production workers. 
So the really important issue was to keep up with errors or interpretation 
problems during field maintenance operations: 
"[The users] have to know that we are just a phonecall away" (Research 
Engineer). 
This feedback opportunity was kept up over 3 years, and only at the time of the 
interview the system was considered error-free enough to be transferred from 
· the R&D-department to a regular operating facility. 
Since the knowledge base was not able to represent all peculiarities of the wells, 
long-term experience and knowledge of locaI production were still helpful for the 
production workers: 
"[The system] does not account for historical data or local operating 
practices. Experienced operators often have a feel for the well's behavior 
judging from its past production history or the performance of similar 
wells. [The system's] use is improved with operator experience" (Research 
engineer). 
Training offered in a 2-day-workshop was planned and introduced from the very 
beginning. It was primarily technical information on using the different systems 
but the research engineer stressed the side-effect for class participants of better 
understanding the organizational context of the company. Knowledge of 
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procedures was necessary to enable the production specialists to report on 
system errors. It became clear from the training courses that it seemed easier 
for the production workers to accept advice from the expert system rather than 
from another person. They wanted to get advice on remaining questions they did 
not discuss during class sessions, since they did not want to show their 
ignorance there. The research department supported this activity, knowing that 
this not only would lead to feedback on system errors, but also to enhanced 
acceptance. 
So, for the production workers it was rewarding to communicate with the 
research department. The output protocol of the system gave them a more 
tangible basis to take precautions for maintenance. However, their group heads, 
the foremen, weren't always convinced of diagnostics prepared with the help of 
the system. This gave reason to incorporate the foremen into the training plan 
as well. So the training course acquired an important function as a 'missing link' 
in the communication process between different organizational units. 
3. Analysis of Development Practices 
Characteristics Comnwn to Both Cases 
The applied practices led to system deployments considered as successful by the 
companies. Nevertheless, as the cases showed, several obstacles emerged during 
the different development stages of the systems. In order to find out what we 
could learn from these experiences we must first consider to what extent the 
practices are transferable. 
As the description of the example settings showed, neither the task domain nor 
the organizational structures are unique to the cases. It is rather the 
confinement to small tasks what seems to restrict transferability. 
Two salient strategies connect the reported cases. The first (a) is the use of the 
expert system approach for small and surveyable tasks rather than for tackling 
complex and large problems. The second (b) is the managerial emphasis put on 
organizational as well as on technical integration and not just the installation 
of a new computer system. Both strategies and their implications shall be 
discussed in sorne detail. 
Ad a: In both companies the characteristics of tasks viewed to be appropriate 
for an expert system approach were similar. The tasks in question were part of 
prestructured work procedures, involving heuristic knowledge about situational 
or temporal circumstances and making use of more or less intensive numerical 
calculations in various cases. Only part of the heuristic knowledge was tried to 
be incorporated into the system, which may be a factor for the relatively quick 
and successful implementations. This differs strongly from tackling ill-structured 
tasks in expert system developments, which was subject of research efforts in 
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Functional solutions for a task can be provided to non-experts as well 
as for experts 
Use: 
Hands-on-experience for users is undisputable, may it be acquired by 
participating in the design process or by training 
Maintenance and update tasks gain importance with the number of 
applications 
Consistency of the knowledge base is crucial for multi-site applications, 
but no organízational procedures are readily available 
Developer(s) and expert(s) must be in reach until a system has gained 
its 'stable state' 
Non-experts may possibly mcrease their competency by using the new 
system 
Formalization of work procedures due to the introduction of an expert 
system allows for more precise or narrowed job descriptions 
Growing degree of formalization points to possible future forros of 
organizational and technical integration. 
Organizational Turbulences 
The two approaches to practices are to sorne degree diff erent and pursue 
different directions concerning skill levels of users, though neither one of them 
so far intends to transform organizational boundaries. EXOFFICE basically relies 
on the users themselves. Tools, a prescriptive framework and sorne help in 
getting started are provided. This is aimed at simplifying certain decision 
making procedures, thereby reducing future skill requirements, and this might 
point to possible organizational ramifications in the future. Experts may have 
to take over other and more demanding tasks or they may not remain experts 
in future office settings of EXOFFICE. EXMAINT on the other hand provides 
an additional tool for users, supporting and strengthening their argumentative 
basis within the given organizational structure. 
In order to minimize organizational friction, practices of EXOFFICE focus on 
involving the users from the very start, while EXMAINT tries the same by a 
'hot-line' service and improved training practices. This difference can be 
explained with regard to the different qualificational levels of the users. While 
EXOFFICE has the experts themselves as users of the systems, EXMAINT 
provides expert (engineering) knowledge for lower skilled users. The latter 
example is in sorne way similar to an externally developed system, confronting 
12 

the user with something already designed. Unlike EXMAINT, the procedures 
used in EXOFFICE are aimed explicitely on reducing the skill level by 
simplifying certain parts of tasks. EXMAINT on the other hand wants to 
enhance skills which were formerly restricted, and then perceived as to be too 
narrow for optimal maintenance procedures. 
In both cases, changes were required during the fielding phase of systems. Most 
importantly, the maintenance of the knowledge base not only required constant 
attention during development, but still remains to be resolved during regular 
use. 
What becomes visible behind the rationale is that even small and unobtrusive 
expert systems require a constant focus of attention on organizational issues. 
This might be invoked by technical aspects (like user interfaces), human aspects 
(like hierarchical frictions), or organizational aspects (like available training 
facilities). So the question remains, to which degree this kind of integrative 
approach to expert systems development, as characterized above, could hope to 
avoid all organizational obstacles. Though integrative approaches like the ones 
described above can be improved gradually by learning from previous pitfalls, 
they are nevertheless likely to encounter non-planned events during future 
projects. It is in the nature of those events that they can only be dealt with 
during the process, not in advance. 
The vivid metaphor of 'turbulences' seems appropriate to characterize the latent 
conflicts, becoming apparent over several isssues of the practices. One conflict 
emerged over understanding and correctness of maintenance procedures within 
the organizational hierarchy in EXMAINT. Another example is the upcoming 
tension between users and centralized system maintenance in EXOFFICE, based 
on the requirement of updating multiple knowledge bases. Resulting competency 
shifts may threaten other user groups and therefore lead to conflicts. In this 
way, both development practices inescapably create their own ambiguities, small 
events in the investigated cases but nevertheless potentially leading to 
turbulences in the organization. 
One of the deeper reasons for the existence of these ambiguities in expert 
systems development might be due to the idealizing view embedded in 
knowledge theory (Wieckert 90). Emerged from the research on Al over the past 
three decades, it generally purveyed a rather mechanical view for knowledge as 
something to be simply extracted, represented, stored and distributed. Although 
the resulting shortcomings are also acknowledged by researchers in the field, 
leading to the search of 'deep' models of knowledge (e.g. Steels 89), its resonance 
can still be found in the practices4 • The vast number of text books on expert 
systems, written in the past few years, can be seen as examples for 
'intermediaries' between theory and practice. Though many of them generally 
point to the limits of the current hard- ·and software, they nevertheless freqently 
carry the ideal perspective of knowledge 'extraction'5• 
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Evidence for the idealizing view exists also in the cases here. For instance, one 
of the definitions given in EXOFFICE for the advantages of an expert system 
describes it as " ... storing valuable knowledge and later delivering it at the point 
of decision making". It shows the weak criteria used to characterize important 
features of knowledge. "Valuable 11 and 11 point of decision making11 were not 
further defined in any sense with respect to what they might mean to 
organizational requirements. 
The analysis of the case studies explains also why expert systems are not simply 
sold as a prescriptive technical package: organization, training, and interfaces 
have to be re-instantiated in each case, unless the most simple ones. The 
shortcomings are not just characteristics of the described cases, but are rooted 
in the underlying assumptions, as discussed. Expert systems 'to go' therefore, 
available from the shelf and to be applied with strict procedural rules would be 
simply contradictary to their basic subject, human knowledge. 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
The expert systems presented here in two case studies are about to fill in niches 
of applications, and also to become part of already existent systems and 
networks. N ot in an impera ti ve top-clown manner as envisioned by sorne of the 
pioneers in the field, but as sort of a 'functional extension' to systems in place. 
This made it important to take a closer look how the technology and 
organizational aspects interact and how the development process is organized. 
Practices for design, transfer and use of small expert systems in different 
industrial areas were analyzed. The examples showed the emphasis put on 
technical and organizational integration by the developers. But despite this 
approach unforeseen outcomes of the development processes still occured, though 
on a small scale. 
The paper explains this effect by showing that, regardless of precautions, the 
rationale contained in the development practices creates ambiguities, likely to 
lead to organizational turbulences. This happens mainly due to slightly shifting 
boundaries of competency between different groups or between users and 
computer. Viewed as an intervention into a work process, knowledge is re-
created to be used within a new context. 
The fact that the recreation as such does not become very obvious during 
development can be connected to an idealizing view on knowledge in the theory 
of expert systems. This theory covers changes in the workplace rather than 
making them the subject of discussion. 
The important practical lesson to be learned from these and other examples is 
that the more human knowledge -- and not just number crunching -- is the 
subject of computerization, the more organizational efforts will be necessary in 
order to reach the goal of a usable system. The cases point to the limits of 
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development practices based on an idealizing theory of human knowledge. 
Contradicting an often heard belief, the cases also speak far the continued 
necessity of training efforts in the context of expert system developments. 
Notes 
l. Mark Fax mentioned the number· of 3000 expert systems to be worldwide in 
test or use at a recent conference (cf. IEEE 90). This number seems low 
compared to sales figures e.g. of the system Windows 3.0, being already in the 
hundred thousands within a few month after release in 1990. 
2. Reports on the diffusion of expert systems in Western industrialized countries 
are incomplete and presented in scattered sources. The situation in the US can 
only be extrapolated from examples in recent conference proceedings, since no 
representative studies were conducted so far. For J apan cf. Hirai 89, where sorne 
recent numbers far industrial sectors are given, showing the strong percentage 
of small systems. 
3. An extensive report of the research study, containing the methodological 
framework, is available on request (in German language). 
4. Needless to say that there are "many Ais" (Papert 88), not just one singular 
or unified 'theory of Artificial Intelligence'. But, in contrast, AI-theory here is 
understood as a social construction: how are popular claims, made by AI-
researchers, perceived and translated by practitioners? 
5. The fallowing example appears representative for arguments presented by 
sorne textbook authors: "Knowledge acquisition is the single biggest problem in 
expert system development. Because knowledge is unorganized and often hidden 
by compiled knowledge, knowledge acquisition is a discovery process, an~ often 
the more that is discovered the more there is to learn. Whether a system 
contains 50 or 5,000 rules, the problems are the same, only their magnitude 
differ" (Laswell 89: 145). Here, a statement of the problem is fallowed by the 
more or less explicit assumption of the existence of knowledge structures 
common to man and machine, in this example 'knowledge clusters' in human 
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